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BOOK I
CHAPTER II
IN WHAT WAY, AND FOR WHAT REASON, THE WILL OF
GOD PERMITS THIS OR THAT |
Here the greater part of men fall into the most miserable error, since
with them the Divine Permission scarcely differs from human, inasmuch as
it rests in idleness, doing nothing, and does not restrain those who
wish to act, even though it can. From this one error countless evils
spring. In consequence of this we rush one upon another, and, as though
we were the artificers of every misfortune and the authors of every
evil, we mutually assail one another with tongue, and hands, and teeth,
as if God all the while were an indifferent Spectator of our quarrels,
and allowed the most grievous acts of injustice when He could prevent
them. This is the very seed‑plot of all disorders, and for the purpose
of uprooting it I proceed to lay down three points to be considered in
every Divine Permission. The first is the Will of permitting. The
second, the Cause of permission. The third, the Will which co‑operates
with that which is permitted.
1. The better to understand this I must repeat that there are two
kinds of evils. The first comprising those things which cause
vexation, pain, loss, disgrace, such as poverty, imprisonment, disease,
banishment, death, which are not to be called evils so much as bitter
medicines administered by the Divine Hand. The second comprising those
things which are properly called evils, as sin. The former kind God
truly wills, either for the punishment of the wicked (as S. Augstine
says, see above chap. 1. 6), or for the correction of His children. The
latter God cannot be said to will, but to permit. For
since God truly wills all things which truly exist (for by His Will all
things are, and without it nothing exists), sin (which is improperly
said to exist) He cannot will, but permits. But since God most clearly
foresees all things that will be, He could easily prevent whatever He
wills to prevent. Since, however, He does not prevent numberless
things, we must conclude that God by His Own most just Will, from
Eternity willed, and so decreed, to permit them. God, then, suffers
anything to be done, not through being unwilling, but through willing
it. Men, indeed, permit many things which they are either unable to
prevent, or which they certainly would prefer not to be done. But not so
the Supreme Ruler of all things. There is, therefore, in God a Will
of permitting, which I have set down as the first point under the
head of Permission. And now the question arises, why God should will to
permit sin, or what is the cause in God of his Permission.
2. Never certainly would such infinite Goodness permit so great
wickedness in the world, unless it could thence produce greater good,
and turn to salvation things which were devised for destruction. God
permitted the jealousy of his brethren to exercise its malice against
innocent Joseph; but with how great good was this Permission, not merely
to his parents and brethren, but to the whole land of Egypt! God
permitted guiltless David to be harassed with the most cruel injuries by
wicked Saul, but it was to the greatest advantage of David himself and
the entire kingdom of Israel. God permitted Daniel, most unjustly
accused, to be cast into the den of lions, but it was to his own great
good and that of many others. But why do I mention such as these? God
permitted His Own Son to be crucified by murderers, but His Permission
was for the ineffable good of the whole human race. And so from every
Divine Permission there flow the greatest increase to the Divine Glory,
and the richest blessings to the human race. Hence the Goodness of God
and His Mercy, hence His Bounty and Power, hence His Providence, hence
his Wisdom and justice shine forth in a way which is altogether
wonderful. Hence it is that the courage of many grows, the contest
thickens, rewards are multiplied, and crowns of victory are increased.
And how worthy of wonder does Divine Providence show itself in these
daily Permissions! For what great thing is it if you have produced good
from good? but it is great indeed if you produce good from evil. Any one
can be a pilot in a calm sea, as the saying, is. (SENEC. Ep. 85.) It
requires no great skill, when the wind is favourable, the ship stout,
the sea calm, the stars shining brightly, and the rowers well used to
their work, to reach the harbour already in sight; but when the winds
are raging, the ship dismantled, the sky thundering, pirates lurking
around, the rowers unskilled in their work, and the stars hidden from
sight, still to reach the wished‑for harbour, this in truth is a feat to
be admired in a pilot. And such is God in His Permissions. By means of
seeming contraries He conducts to a happy end. By means of so many sins
of men he advances His Own Glory. In such an accumulation of wickedness
He causes His Own dear ones to shine the more conspicuously. Under God's
guidance, acts of fraud turn to the advantage of the person who has
been deceived; vexations and injuries add strength to the vexed; the
wickedness of so many abandoned men strengthens the piety of others, and
preserves them from perishing; and where many are thought to be utterly
swallowed up they emerge again. The dungeon and chains opened for
Joseph the way to an exalted throne of dignity; the envy of his brethren
was of more service to him than the kindness of all the world besides.
The treachery of Saul conferred on David a kingly crown. The den of
lions raised Daniel higher than any courtiers or kings could have done.
From ‑the Cross Christ passed to Paradise; from Olivet He ascended to
the Throne with the Father. But if God did not permit sins, and did not
ordain what He permitted, and did not by His Ordinance turn them into
good, we should have difficulty in recognizing the avenging justice of
God. But in this way we are taught lessons of deeper wisdom, and are
constrained to confess a most wonderful order and connection of causes,
by which so many blessings emerge at length from evils of such
magnitude. There are, therefore, manifold causes for the Divine
Permission. And this was the second point.
3. The third point is the Will of God co‑operating, in everything
which He permits. God decreed from eternity not only what in the course
of time He would permit, nor only the most just causes of His
Permission, but He also had, and still has, a Will which co‑operates in
all His Permissions. In the schools of Theologians it is a point most
clearly laid down, that God is the Helper of all those things which
really are done and exist. Nothing exists anywhere without the help of
the First and Chief Cause.
Since, then, God from eternity decreed to permit all those things which
He does permit, and this for the most just reasons; and furthermore
since He makes Himself a Helper in His Permissions, why do we assail
Heaven and men with so many and such foolish complaints? Why do we so
often rail at the Providence and most just Permissions of God? Why do we
not rather ascribe all events to the Divine Decree, feeling sure that
most just and weighty grounds of Divine Permission are lying underneath,
and that an end of the deepest moment is proposed, against which it ill
beseems us to struggle? Good and evil wills alike serve God; and among
their various ends they all come to this, which, if I may so call it,
is the End of ends.
Without question the holiest men have ever held it as the most certain
truth that all things happened to them as if God were the Doer of them;
because turning away the eyes of their mind from the thought of
another's sin, they constantly viewed the Permissions of God as the
actual and efficient causes of whatever happened. For God is so Good
that on no account would he permit evil, unless he knew that from it He
could produce greater good. S. Augustine speaks most admirably to the
point (Ench. tom. III. c. 27 et I I ) :‑"God has judged it better," he
says, "to work good out of evil, than to allow no evil. For since He is
supremely Good, He would in no way allow any evil to be in His Works,
unless He were as Omnipotent as Good, so as to be able to bring good
even out of evil." Excellently, too, does Theophilus Bernardinus speak
(De Persev. 1 XI. C. 4) :‑"God," he says, winds Himself in among our
errors and sins in a most penetrating way, not indeed as approving and
participating in them, but as turning us away from 1hem and correcting
them, since out of evil things He brings forth the more good, just as if
it was fire out of water." And here we must reflect, as the same writer
admonishes us, that all who hurt us (in whatever way the injury is
done) support a two‑fold character. One in which they have wicked
intentions towards us, and devise no common mischief against us; the
other, in which they are able to effect what they have devised,
and are the instrument of the Divine justice which punishes us. If they
only acted out the first character, viz., of malicious people, they
would not hurt us at all; but because they support the other also, they
do the work of God, Who justly punishes us, even though they act in
ignorance of His designs. In this way Nabuchodonosor was a servant of
God; and so, too, Attila, Totila, and Tamerlane, the scourge of God.
Thus also Vespasian and his son, for the love of glory, and to increase
their dominion, endeavoured to destroy the Jews; but they erred. In
reality they were the executioners and ministers of the Divine Vengeance
against that impious nation. The Jews could not digest their happiness
without the help of these Imperial warm baths. But that we may follow
out this line of reasoning more closely, let me ask a few questions.
4. I direct my questions to you, my Christian friend, to you
particularly who so frequently disturb heaven and earth with your
complaints. Be kind enough to tell me what you find fault with in the
man who has injured you? Is it only with his will of injuring you, or
only with his power, or both? With both, you will say. But
I will instruct you not to find fault with either. Not with the will of
injuring, for this without the power is vain, and has never done you any
harm at all. Not with the power of injuring, for this is from God, and
is just and right. You know that "there is no power but from God." (Rom.
XIII. I.) Why do you then complain that one is able to do to you what
God permits him to do? A great injury is done to me, you will say. But
what sort of injury is it, let me ask? God punishes your sins, exercises
your patience multiplies your reward, and is an injury (lone to your
Yes, but, you say, I am filled with indignation at this wicked man, and
his will which is so thoroughly corrupt. But you persist in looking at
man, while I wish you to look at God alone. However
corrupt the human will may be, what has it been able to do? What has it
done? You do not grieve on this account, because he willed to
injure you, but because he actually did injure you, or was
able to injure you. But why, I would ask, and how could he do this?
Whence did he derive the power? And why had he the power? Was it not
from the Divine Power and Permission? And if it is Divine, is it not
also just, laudable, and holy? Therefore, either hold your peace, or
else direct your complaints against the Divine Permission, and engrave
this on your mind, that God never would permit that the wicked will of
another should devise any evil against you, if it were not for your
good, provided that you yourself do not become a hindrance. "And who is
he that can hurt you, if you be zealous of good?" (I Pet. III. U) S.
Augustine (in PS. LXI. 21) says, most admirably:‑"Fear not the enemy; so
much he doeth as he hath received power to do. Him fear thou that hath
the chief power. Him fear that doeth as much as He willeth. and that
doeth nothing unjustly, and whatever He shall have done is just, We
might suppose something or other to be unjust: but inasmuch as God bath
done it, believe it to be just. Therefore, thou sayest, if any one slay
an innocent man, doth he justly or unjustly? Unjustly, certainly.
Wherefore doth God permit this? Thou desirest to dispute before that
thou doest anything, in 6onsideration whereof thou mayest be worthy to
dispute, why God bath permitted this. The Counsel of God to tell to
thee, O man, I am not able. This thing, however, I say, both that the
man bath done unjustly that bath slain an innocent person, and that it
would not have been done unless God permitted it; and though the man
bath done unjustly, yet God bath not unjustly permitted this."
And in the same way he speaks of the death of our Lord:‑"Accordingly, my
brethren, both Judas, the foul traitor to Christ, and the persecutors of
Christ, malignant all, ungodly all, unjust all, are to be condemned
all; and, nevertheless, the Father bath not spared His Own proper Son,
but for the sake of us all He bath delivered Him up. (Rom. VIII 32.)
Order if thou art able; distinguish these things if thou art able.
Render to God thy vows which thy lips have uttered. See what the unjust
bath here done, what the just One. The one bath willed, the Other bath
permitted: the one unjustly bath willed, the Other justly bath
permitted. Let unjust will be condemned, just Permission be glorified.
Do not therefore wonder; God permitteth, and in judgment permitteth. He
permitteth, and in number, weight, and measure He permitteth. With Him
is not iniquity. Do thou only belong to Him."
This then is the shortest way to attain tranquillity, - not to regard
the man who inflicts an injury, but God Who permits it. It was
the custom of the Saints to think, not of him who for any reason might
do them a wrong, but of Him who did not hinder the wrongdoer. Thus they
accounted even injuries to be blessings;‑ "for the doers of injustice,"
they said, "are those who make us blessed; but those who speak of us as
blessed, deceive us." And so, with eyes ever fixed upon God, they rested
on the Divine Will in everything, and waited to receive all things from
God.
But understand from this that no man's sin merits pardon the more
because God brings forth the greater good from it;‑for man affords the
occasion of good alone, not the cause; and even the occasion he does not
afford of himself, but through the abundance of the Divine Goodness. If
some wicked person has set fire to the cottage of a poor man, he has not
on this account committed the less sin, because the poor man has borne
his loss patiently, or some prince has erected in its place a ten times
better house. Another person's virtue and a happy circumstance do not
wipe out the guilt of the incendiary; and so sin does not acquire any
excellence because it has afforded opportunity for doing good. But that
we may understand this the better, we must now consider how secret are
the judgments of God.
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